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ECONOMICS, MARKET BEHAVIOR,
AND THE LAWt
Vernon L. Smith*
It is indeed an honor to be the person who is going to inaugurate
this wonderful lecture series.
I learned about Cleveland very early in life. Probably, by the time
I was six or seven years old, I knew that my father had apprenticed
here as a machinist and this is where my father learned the tool mak-
ing trade. This was the Mecca, this was the center; this is where you
came in 1919 or 1920 to learn that trade. On the one hand, my fa-
ther's influence, without any question, was what started me off in a
career in engineering and science. I became interested in economics
as an undergraduate and I ended up developing a rather keen interest
in studying market performance, having inherited from my father a
very strong interest in how things work. He could make anything and
he could fix anything. On the other hand, of course, I am an unlikely
person to have developed a career in the study of markets. I had to
overcome two very significant handicaps. First, my mother was a
Socialist and raised me to be one; and second, I have a Harvard edu-
cation.
I am going to begin with a quotation from David Hume. "Manu-
facturers gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and
provinces which they have already enriched and flying to others
wither they are allured by the cheapness of provisions and labor 'till
they have enriched these also and are again banished by the same
causes." I am going to mostly talk today about two kinds of markets;
the first consists of the commodity and service markets, and these are
the type of markets that I first started studying in the laboratory, that
t This essay is based upon the inaugural Dean Lindsey Cowen Business Law Lecture
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ily Foundation, and part of the School of Law's Center for Business Law & Regulation.
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we characterize as recurrent flow, supply and demand markets. I
started out with very simple isolated markets for a single commodity,
motivating both buyers and sellers, the human subjects in the experi-
ment. Then we moved to more complex, multi-market, equilibrium
systems. And this was a tremendous learning experience for me. I
had no idea based upon my training that these markets could so
quickly discover competitive equilibrium and yield efficient out-
comes. Then much later we in the laboratory turned to the study of
asset or stock markets, and we found those to be very different ani-
mals. So I'll talk a little bit about that. And also, at the end, I want to
talk about globalization, but I want to try to relate this laboratory ex-
perience with events and understanding about markets in the world
that has come to me and other experimentalists.
There are very good reasons to support the belief that exchange
has its origin in reciprocity and sharing norms in the family, the ex-
tended family, and tribes. This personal exchange, as we have come
to call it, allowed for the task specialization in hunting and gathering
that laid the basis for enhanced productivity and welfare, which in
turn enabled early peoples to migrate all over the world. I think there
is a good basis for that argument. The ancient norm of reciprocity
and trading favors emerges in two person games in the laboratory
between anonymously matched subjects, many of whom used trust
and trustworthiness to achieve cooperative outcomes that consciously
increase joint benefits. They voluntarily avoid choosing outcomes
that take for themselves without giving something in return to their
matched counterpart.
Let me give a simple example. Suppose I am matched with you
and we are in a room with several other people that are similarly
matched. I will never know who I am matched with, and you will
never know who you are matched with, so we maintain anonymity. I
move first and I have two options: I can opt out and we each get ten
dollars and we'll be paid in cash after everybody has finished; or I can
pass to you and you have two options. First, you can give me fifteen
dollars and you keep twenty-five dollars. (Notice that the original pie
has doubled and is now forty dollars.) Or, you can take all of the
money and leave me nothing. Those are your two options.
Well, I see the payoffs, you see the payoffs, and game theory as-
sumes people are self-interested in the very, very narrow sense that
we always choose dominant strategies. In this case, if I passed to
you, I can see that forty dollars is better for you than twenty-five.
You will go for the forty dollars, leaving me nothing; so I shouldn't
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pass to you. The equilibrium of the game then is for me to opt out and
we each get ten bucks.
Well, fifty percent of the thirty pairs of the people in this game
passed to the other person. The other fifty percent took the 10 dollars
and played it like game theory predicts. Of the half that passed to the
second person, three-quarters of them choose the 15-25 split. One-
quarter do what we call "defect," taking the forty dollars.
Now, this is not something you can understand within the frame-
work of traditional game theory. We have varied payoffs across many
other experiments, and the results are robust. We have now tested a
number of alternative hypotheses and the one that survives as the best
explanation is the following: People are coming into the room from a
world of social exchange in the sense that they are accustomed to
trading favors. "I owe you one," is a common English phrase. You
have that expression in German, Spanish, Italian, and French; evi-
dence indicating that it is both human and universal. What is striking
is that this norm is so strong that it survives in the laboratory even
though people are anonymously matched. We were trying to create
an environment where you had every incentive to defect and the other
person could see that you had every incentive to defect and yet we did
not get nearly as much of that behavior as game theory predicts.
Of course, I can give you lots of examples of this from the world
and you can probably think of more of them than I can. I remember
when we moved to the farm. My father lost his job at the Bridgeport
Machine Company and we moved to the farm that my parents had
bought with the insurance money available from the Santa Fe Rail-
road (my mother's first husband was a fireman who had been killed in
a train accident-very common in those days). That was in 1918 and
she married my father in 1921, and this money was invested in the
farm. So we moved to the farm hoping that we could subsist there.
In the end, we lost the farm to the bank because they shared owner-
ship with us.
I remember very clearly that we could only afford one horse. To
harrow you only needed one horse and for pulling the wagon one
horse was enough as well. If you were going to plow you really
needed two, so we had to borrow a horse. I remember my father re-
turning the horse and offering to help the owner of the horse to install
the new windows he had for his house. That is how this rural com-
munity worked. People in 1932, in this farming community forty-five
miles from Wichita, Kansas, had almost no cash at all. What little
cash you had was used to buy things that you could not make, things
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that you had to import like a cream separator, or a water pump. You
used cash to buy imports from the outside.
Returning to the laboratory, suppose the same subjects who con-
sciously cooperate for their mutual betterment in these elementary
two-person interactions come to the laboratory to trade in an imper-
sonal experimental market. By impersonal markets I mean that sev-
eral people, at least four or five, trade electronically through the rules
for some institution that we define for them. What do they do in these
markets? They strive to maximize their own gain. But in this process
they also maximize the joint benefits to the group although this is not
intended. They have no way of knowing what that joint benefit is.
The experimentalist knows this and confirms it. These markets are, of
course, supported by property right rules that the experimenter en-
forces; rules that prevent people from taking without giving in return.
In an established commodity and service market, producers incur
recurrent, relatively predictable, stable costs. Consumers experience
corresponding recurrent flows of value from consumption. But these
costs and values are inherently private and the information is dis-
persed. In the laboratory, we create that same situation by assigning
values to the buyers, costs to the sellers. We pay cash to the buyers-
the difference between the values we assigned to them privately and
the price they pay in the market; thus motivating them to buy low.
The sellers are motivated to buy high because they get the difference
between the prices at which they sell to the buyers and the private
costs we have assigned them.
Command and control economies have failed because this dis-
persed information cannot be known to anyone. But how do we know
that the price-discovery process in commodity markets yields effi-
cient surplus maximizing outcomes? Well, in these controlled ex-
periments involving impersonal exchange, over and over again, in
hundreds of replications, we see rapid convergence to the equilibrium
outcome. The subjects are not aware of their achievement of the
group welfare maximizing ends that they are producing because they
do not have all the information it takes to identify the equilibrium or
to identify the desirable outcome. In other words, we deliberately
create a market where information is private and dispersed and ask
how efficient is the information exchange that naturally occurs in the
institution that we study. For example, we have studied a great many
sealed bid-offer auctions. In repeat interaction, how effective are
people able to achieve these welfare maximizing outcomes? The
answer: they are highly effective.
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It is very clear that they are unaware of what they have done. For
example, if you are doing these experiments as a teaching exercise
you have the opportunity to ask people questions about how they per-
ceive it. After an experiment, people will deny that any kind of a
model is able to predict their price outcomes. But before the experi-
ment begins, you make sure that someone in the class gets a sealed
envelope with the equilibrium price and quantity. Then, have her
open it afterward. Written there is the predicted outcome.
They also believe that, as individuals, it ought to have been possi-
ble for them each to do better than they did. They will always report,
"Oh, yes, it truly would be possible for the individual to do better,"
but actually that is not true by definition of equilibrium. Each is do-
ing the best he or she can do given the behavior of everyone else.
These are just some examples showing that people make markets
work-they do not have to know any economics, they do not have to
know anything about supply and demand, they do not need to know
any mathematics. In a multiple market experiment, the most that
buyers are willing to pay for A depends on the price of B and vice
versa, and you set this up with simultaneous non-linear equations to
solve for the equilibrium. It takes a few periods longer than for a
single commodity market but it converges to the equilibrium. The
buyers have no idea how to solve those non-linear equations. They
do not even know what they have done. Ladies and gentlemen, this
was an eye-opener for me and a lot has happened since these early
experiments that I did about 50 years ago.
Now, let me ask what we have learned about markets in the world
and how this experimental research applies. I think it is clear that
commodity and service markets are the foundation of existing wealth
creation. This is a basic principle, of course, but we actually see it
demonstrated in the experiments.
Each of us earns our income from only one or two sources while
then using and consuming hundreds and hundreds of items throughout
the day that are produced by others whom we do not know and never
will know. The hallmark of commodity and service markets is diver-
sity; diversity of tastes and skills, knowledge, natural resources, soil,
and climate. This diversity accounts for the differences in the values
and costs that we use to define and motivate gain from exchange in
the laboratory. So we create an environment which reflects that kind
of diversity. And, as I have said, I believe that it is reasonable to ar-
gue that this diversity was encouraged initially through the sharing
and the reciprocity norms within the family.
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Ethnologists have been studying extant hunting and gathering so-
cieties for over 100 years, and it has become clear that these stateless
hunter-gatherers societies were highly specialized. The women and
children gathered fruits, nuts, tubers, grains. The men hunted. The
old men, no longer able to stand the rigors of the hunt, advised in the
hunt and made tools and weapons, and rejoined some of the gathering
activities. We have observed in these economies with no money and
no barter that sharing customs nonetheless constitute an exchange
system that allows a limited amount of specialization to occur and
create wealth.
Now at many times and places in prehistory, this kind of exchange
system was extended to strangers who bartered, and ultimately led to
the use of commodity money. Indeed, early humans set the stage for
a vast expansion of wealth and well being whenever they discovered
that it was better to trade with their neighboring tribes than to kill
them. If you kill them they cannot produce something and trade with
you tomorrow, nor can you benefit from their unique skills in learn-
ing, art, culture and experience. Similarly, if you let them live and
then steal from them, they are much less willing to produce for you
tomorrow than if you trade with them today.
Diversity requires freedom because it is freedom that allows each
to be as different as he or she is able and desires to become. Markets
in turn support tolerance of freedom. Chile, for example, had little
political freedom but opened the economy to freer choice and this
freedom spread to political choice and brought democracy. Likewise,
I think that there is a good chance that this will happen in China,
where the central government recently moved to legalize property
ownership largely because of corruption. In fact, people in China
already do own property; it is recognized and traded in the commu-
nity. Since the property owners lack a government recognized title,
however, it is tempting for bureaucrats to extract payments from the
property owners. Well, the central government is concerned about
that because, after all, what China has learned is that this greater eco-
nomic freedom has enormously improved productivity and betterment
in China. Anyway, we will see how and to what extent this greater
freedom spreads to the political sphere.
We have need of others and the diversity that they bring to the ta-
ble if we are to rise above bare subsistence. Through markets we
depend upon others whom we do not know, recognize, or understand.
We know not how and in what way others contribute to our welfare,
nor how we contribute to theirs. Such are the long, subtle chains of
interdependence through markets connected by prices.
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The welfare of each of us, as individuals, depends vitally upon the
knowledge and skills of others with whom we trade through markets,
for without markets we would, indeed, be the poor, the miserable, and
the brutish. If some were less poor it would be because of conquest
or theft, taking without giving in return which can be sustained only
for as long as there is someone to conquer.
Markets require consensual enforcement of the rules for social and
economic exchange. No one said it better than David Hume over 250
years ago when he said that there are just three laws of human nature:
First, the right of possession; second, transference by consent; and
third, the performance of promises. These are the ultimate founda-
tions of order, with or without formal law, that make markets and
prosperity possible. Notice that we are seeing the same principles
emerging in China and creating problems because they are colliding
with the former law. We are seeing changes in the former law to ac-
commodate the social norms.
It is important to make the distinction between what Hayek calls
"found law" and "made law." He points out that the early law givers
did not make law, rather they discovered it in social practices, and
then announced it. That is what David Hume was doing. And you
have perhaps noticed that Hume's laws of nature are derived from the
ancient Judeo-Christian commandments: thou shalt not steal; thou
shalt not covet thy neighbor's possessions; thou shalt not bear false
witness. But these same commandments are urged in other cultural
groups and religions all over the world. The game of steal consumes
wealth without encouraging its reproduction, while the game of trade
sustains and grows abundance. Coveting the possessions of others
invites an involuntary state-enforced redistribution of the gains from
specialization and trade, endangering incentives to produce tomor-
row's harvest, possibly as surely as its theft. And, of course, bearing
false witness undermines community, management credibility, inves-
tor trust and confidence, long-term profitability and the personal so-
cial exchanges that are most humanizing. We have seen what the
stock market does to a company and its management and its stock-
holders as soon as that management loses its credibility with inves-
tors. Enron, for example, went right down the tubes and fast.
I want to turn now to stock markets but before I do that, let me just
say a little bit about what has happened since the early work in ex-
perimental markets. An awful lot of the day-to-day work that my
colleagues and I do has been concerned with using the laboratory as a
test bed to study the performance of new markets where they have
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never been applied before, and people are not sure if it is possible to
extend markets to these new applications.
For example, in the electric power industry in Australia, it was the
buyers who wanted to restructure the industry. It was representatives
of the buy-side of the market, particularly industrial and commercial
users of power, who thought that the government-owned power sys-
tem was too costly. They felt they were paying far more than they
should have to pay for power. These users of power have to compete
in world markets, and in Australia there are a lot of energy intensive
products made for export. So if a major input like power is more ex-
pensive than it needed to be then that creates problems for them. That
ultimately led to substantial liberalization of that industry in Austra-
lia, as well as in New Zealand.
The Australians developed the software for trading energy, and we
served as consultants in their experiments. They wanted to go
through the exercise themselves, to design and conduct experiments
before they moved their market designs into the field, and that learn-
ing was enormously important in demonstrating to them that it was
feasible and that it can be done. Of course, in the experiments they
were trading energy on a grid that represented their parameters in
Australia, so it is just the same as it was going to be when they started
trading power in the economy. They used subjects whose profits
were paid to them in cash. They did fairly long experiments, seven
hours a day for two weeks, and developed a professional group of
traders. Without going into a lot of other examples, suffice it to say
that this illustrates where we are now in the study of commodity and
service markets.
Now, let me turn to the laboratory stock markets. Most interesting
is that even in these markets where fundamental values are well-
defined, inexperienced subjects do not trade stocks at their fundameri-
tal value. They produce big bubbles and crashes. Bring them back a
second time and we will see another boom and crash, although with-
out as much volume. Bring them back a third time, and finally they
start to trade around the fundamental value. It is an experiential proc-
ess whereby they come to accept that this thing called a holding
value, or the dividend value of a share, is something they had better
pay attention to. They don't get there by logic, or by thinking about
it. They get there through an experiential process. So, the behavior
in the laboratory with regard to these stock markets is very erratic
compared to the recurrent flow markets for goods.
Of course, we see what appear to be big bubbles out there in the
world. These are not new; there is nothing new about bubbles and
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crashes. They are basically fueled by new technologies, If you go,
for example, back to the 19th-century, the steam engine allowed the
steamship to replace the square rigger and the steam locomotive to
replace the mule team and stage coach. This fueled a huge expansion
in the American railroad industry. The expansion outran the shipping
needs of inter-regional trade, profitability turned to losses, bankrupt-
cies, consolidations, but out of that came huge, long-term values, cre-
ated and retained for the entire economy.
At the turn of the 20th-century you have all of these innovations,
the telephone, electricity, and petroleum, taking off with the devel-
opment of the automobile and sustaining investment and economic
development. And that development involved over-expansion. In the
rush to enter into the electric power industry, cities were giving fran-
chises for electric companies and telephone companies to all who
would apply. So, as is common with a new product, i.e. for new
products that have a strong appeal, it starts out in very high demand.
With a high demand, prices are high and you have a rush of entry by
new firms because it is so profitable. Then there is a shake out and
bankruptcies, consolidations and that sort of adjustment afterward.
The difference in electric power was that you had the introduction
of regulation. In a 1915 collection of public speeches, Sam Insull
argued for rate of return regulation to create profit stability in the
electric industry. He wanted guarantees that all would get a fair re-
turn on their investment. This move to regulate industry was coming
from the industry not consumers, and a very strong force behind that
was Sam Insull, the leading executive in the industry.
I grew up in Wichita, Kansas and in 1929 there were 15 manufac-
turers of light planes: Lark, Lear, Swift, Travelair, and so on. Two
new companies had made their entry in 1927, Cessna and Stearman.
The name of Walter Beach was not known yet, at least in manage-
ment. He was a test pilot and was involved in some of the existing
companies. Interestingly, a decade later, out of the 15 upstart compa-
nies, Stearman, Cessna and Beach emerged and made Wichita an
international aviation center.
Walter Beach died in the 1940s. His wife, Olive Ann Beach, took
over the company and she was actually one of the great woman ex-
ecutives in this country. She was president of the first corporation
headed by a woman to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
That was Beach Aircraft. My point is that there were lots and lots of
contenders for survival in that industry. After the stock market crash
in 1929, Clyde Cessna, Walter Beach and Lloyd Stearman bought up
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the assets of those companies, consolidated them and went on to cre-
ate a major worldwide industry.
So picking winners and identifying losers is inherently risky and
difficult, if not impossible. We have seen, here, in the decade of the
1990s, an unprecedented number of new IPOs come to market. Peo-
ple were experimenting with managing a host of new technologies.
And it is not an accident that we now find ourselves, as the economy
comes back, growing very rapidly. We are getting more output with
less labor. That is a long-term trend in manufacturing. I think it is
almost certainly going to go the way of agriculture, that is, more and
more output with less labor.
New innovations add to productivity. It is not clear to me how
you can avoid the individual pain of losses and also get the long-term
value that comes out of these stock market bubbles. We just do not
know what kind of a policy fix would work that would avoid the risk
of doing more harm than good. Here is the problem: if you limit peo-
ple's decisions to make risky investments and attempt to keep them
from harming themselves, how much will that reduce our capacity to
achieve technological advancement? The hope of great individual
gain fuels thousands of experiments in an environment of great uncer-
tainty as to which experiment will be successful and what combina-
tion of management and new technology will actually work. After a
big wave of innovation and the bubble bursts you have managers that
have learned a lot about what does not work and even a little bit about
what does work. And I think that process is very necessary. Cer-
tainly if I knew how to get the benefit without incurring a cost, I
would be rich overnight. I could endow lots of lectures and buildings
everywhere. It would be very easy. But of course, we do not know
how to do that and if someone tells you they do, keep your hands in
your pockets.
To say a few words about globalization, I see globalization as hav-
ing begun at least 40-50,000 years ago. Some time around then, as
far as we can tell from the best evidence that we now have, the ances-
tors of all of us walked out of Africa. These were the Cro-Magnon
peoples. One branch of these people made it to Australia by 40,000
years ago. By 11-12,000 years ago a branch of this original family
had settled in North and South America. They spread throughout the
world. The final settlements came in New Zealand and Madagascar,
which were only settled about 1000 years ago. So, long before the
square rigger sailing ship our ancestors had settled every continent
except Antarctica and all the major islands. The ethnographic and
archeological records suggest that people traded very early, long be-
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fore nation-states. Ethnographic studies show that people traded
goods and weapons, but also public goods like symbols, customs,
crests, and unmolested rights of access to trading routes. They would
reach agreements on the exchange of these public goods, and this
paved the way for individual rights to trade.
To summarize briefly, commodity and service markets are the
foundation of existing wealth creation. Stock markets serve by sup-
plying capital for new products and this explains why they are inher-
ently uncertain, unpredictable, and volatile, tending to bubble and
crash. Stock markets are far more uncertain than markets for com-
modities and services because stock markets must anticipate innova-
tions in commodities and services of the future. Finally, globalization
is not new. It is the modem word describing an ancient human
movement, a word for mankind's search for betterment and the
worldwide expansion of resource specialization which is determined
by the extent of market development. I think globalization is a good
word. Some people disagree. But I think it is a good word, a peace-
ful word. As the great French economist, Frederic Bastiat, wisely
pronounced, "If goods don't cross borders, soldiers will."
Thank you.
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